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THE SOCIOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE
DIMENSIONS OF POLICY-BASED
PERSUASION
Michael R. Smith*
Experts in legal advocacy have long recognized the importance
of policy arguments in legal persuasion.1 Despite the prevalence of
policy arguments as tools in legal advocacy, very little scholarship
has been produced instructing legal advocates on how to write
effective policy arguments in their briefs. Professor Ellie Margolis
addressed this oversight in modern advocacy pedagogy in her 2001
article, Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Policy
Arguments in Appellate Briefs.2 Professor Margolis’ article takes a
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for the Study of Written
Advocacy, University of Wyoming College of Law. I would like to thank the
George Hopper Faculty Research Fund for providing funds in support of this
article. I would also like to thank Elizabeth Fajans and Marilyn Walter of
Brooklyn Law School for the opportunity to participate in the Cognitive Bias
Symposium and to publish this article as part of the symposium proceedings. I
would also like to thank the following people and organizations for allowing me
to present earlier versions of this topic and for the helpful feedback that I
received at those presentations: Panel organizer Michael Murray and The Legal
Writing, Reasoning, and Research Section of the AALS, who invited me to
speak on this topic at the 2011 AALS Annual Meeting; Jan Levine of Duquesne
University School of Law, who invited me to speak on this topic at the 2011
Second Colonial Frontier Legal Writing Conference; and Derek KiernanJohnson of The University of Colorado School of Law, who organized a faculty
colloquium on this topic in 2011. Finally, I would like to thank Tawnya Plumb
of The University of Wyoming College of Law for her research assistance.
1
See, e.g., JOHN C. DERNBACH ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL
WRITING & LEGAL METHOD 349–50 (4th ed. 2010); LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL
WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION 6, 310–11 (5th ed. 2010);
RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING:
STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE 309–13 (6th ed. 2009); HELENE S. SHAPO
ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 264–70 (5th ed. 2008).
2
Ellie Margolis, Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Policy
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number of important steps toward improving the instruction on
effective policy argumentation. First, her article explains the types
of legal issues that give rise to policy arguments and explores the
general functions that policy arguments serve in the resolution of
those issues.3 Second, her article reviews in detail various
substantive categories of policy arguments that previously had
been explored in jurisprudential scholarship and examines the
applicability of these categories to legal advocacy.4 Third,
Professor Margolis, in the most pragmatic part of the article,
explains how legal advocates can strengthen their policy arguments
by incorporating citations to persuasive authority, both legal and
non-legal.5
Professor Margolis’ article brought much-needed attention to
the lack of adequate training in policy-based persuasion and
offered the first formalized instruction in that area. This article
builds on Professor Margolis’ work by exploring policy arguments
from a social science perspective. More specifically, this article
examines policy-based persuasion from the standpoints of both
sociology theory and cognitive psychology theory. For legal
advocates to truly master the skill of policy persuasion, the
cognitive processes underlying this type of advocacy must be
explored and understood. Knowing the mental processes involved
in policy persuasion will enable legal advocates to produce more
effective arguments based on policy. Moreover, understanding
how policy arguments fit within the legal system from a
sociological standpoint will help advocates more fully appreciate
how policy persuasion differs from other types of legal persuasion.
This knowledge, too, will allow advocates to employ this strategy

Arguments in Appellate Briefs, 62 MONT. L. REV. 59 (2001) [hereinafter
Margolis, Closing the Floodgates]. For Professor Margolis’ specific discussion
of the lack of literature on making effective policy arguments, see id. at 60 &
n.8.
3
Id. at 65–70.
4
Id. at 70–79.
5
Id. at 79–83 (applying to policy-based persuasion her general advice on
citing non-legal materials in legal arguments, which she explored in her previous
article, Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal
Materials in Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 197 (2000) [hereinafter
Margolis, Beyond Brandeis].
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more readily and effectively. This article takes the first step in
exploring policy-based persuasion from both of these social
science perspectives.
Part I of this article generally defines the concept of a policy
argument in terms of sociological principles and cognitive
psychology principles. This section identifies the unique role
policy-based persuasion plays in legal decision-making and
explores the general mental processes underlying this type of
advocacy. Part II sets out a new categorization scheme for policy
arguments based on the different broad cognitive processes
involved in such arguments. In this section, we will see that policy
arguments, from a cognitive perspective, fall into two broad
categories: policy arguments that focus primarily on the future, and
policy arguments that focus on both the present and the future. The
discussion of these two broad categories of policy arguments sets
up the final section, Part III, where we explore specific rhetorical
strategies brief writers can use to improve the effectiveness of their
policy arguments. Building on the categorization scheme set out in
Part II and the other principles of social science explored in Part I,
this final section identifies and examines specific guidelines for
maximizing the persuasive impact of policy-based advocacy.
I. A SOCIAL SCIENCE DEFINITION OF A POLICY ARGUMENT
A. A Working Example: The Interspousal Immunity Scenario
Before we explore a definition of a policy argument in terms of
sociological and cognitive principles, I will set out a hypothetical
example of this type of argument. I will return to this example
many times in this article to illustrate various points about policy
arguments.
Assume that we are lawyers practicing in a jurisdiction that
recognizes interspousal immunity as a defense to a tort suit.6
Under interspousal immunity, a spouse as a general matter cannot

6

I have used this interspousal immunity example of a policy argument in
my prior writings. See MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING:
THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 95–96 (3d ed. 2013).
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sue the other spouse for injuries resulting from a tort.7
Jurisdictions that recognize interspousal immunity generally do so
for two reasons. First, these jurisdictions believe that allowing one
spouse to sue another would have an embittering effect on the
marriage due to the adversarial nature of litigation. Thus, in an
effort to preserve marital harmony, these jurisdictions bar such
suits.8 Second, these jurisdictions also fear that allowing insured
spouses to sue each other could lead to rampant insurance fraud.
Because spouses live together and share finances and living
expenses, there is a fear that an insured defendant spouse would
not earnestly defend against the suit because a judgment for the
plaintiff spouse paid by the defendant’s insurer would actually
benefit both spouses.9
Assume further that we are representing a defendant in a tort
suit and are confronted with an issue of first impression in our
jurisdiction: whether interspousal immunity applies to bar a suit
between divorced parties for a tort committed during marriage.
The plaintiff’s counsel in such a scenario could logically argue that
interspousal immunity should not bar the suit because the parties
are no longer spouses. What’s more, the plaintiff’s attorney could
argue that the reasons underlying the immunity do not apply in this
situation because (1) there is no longer marital harmony—or even
a marriage—to protect from the rigors of the adversarial process,
and (2) insurance fraud is not more likely to occur in this situation
than in any other arms-length lawsuit because a judgment for the
plaintiff does not automatically benefit the defendant ex-spouse.
In response to this logical argument by the plaintiff’s counsel,
we as the defendant’s counsel could make a policy argument. We
could argue that allowing this suit would actually encourage
divorce on a societal scale. The argument would go like this: If the
court were to hold in this case that interspousal immunity does not
apply to a suit between divorced spouses for a tort committed
during marriage, then a spouse injured through the tortious conduct

7

See generally, e.g., Robeson v. Int’l Indemnity Co., 282 S.E.2d 896 (Ga.
1991). The discussion of interspousal immunity in the text is based on Georgia
law.
8
E.g., id. at 898–99.
9
E.g., id.
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of his or her mate in the future could avoid the interspousal
immunity defense by divorcing before filing suit. An injured
spouse would be advised by his or her attorney that he or she could
stay married to the tortfeasor and be barred from recovery or
divorce the tortfeasor and seek compensation in court. It is not
unlikely that many injured spouses would choose the option of
divorce and recovery over the option of marriage and no recovery.
Thus, from a societal standpoint, such a rule would amount to a
financial incentive for divorce.
With this policy argument, we as counsel for the defendant
spouse could try to persuade the court to hold that suits for torts
committed during marriage are barred even if the parties divorce
prior to the initiation of the lawsuit. Our argument would be based
on the policies of protecting marriage as a social institution and
avoiding the encouragement of divorce.
B. The Definition of a Policy Argument
Many definitions of a policy argument have been offered in the
previous literature on the topic.10 I, however, offer a new definition
of a policy argument in terms of sociological and psychological
principles:
A policy argument is an argument made by a
legal advocate to a court that urges the court to
resolve the issue before it by establishing a new
rule that advances or protects a particular social
value implicated by the issue.
To see how I have arrived at this definition, the words of the
definition must be examined closely.
1. “. . . to a court . . .”
The first part of the definition states as follows: “A policy
10

See authorities cited supra note 1. See also WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE
TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 51 (2d ed. 2008); Margolis, Closing the
Floodgates, supra note 2, at 70.
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argument is an argument made by a legal advocate to a court.”
This language highlights the fact that the definition is limited to the
context of legal advocacy in the court system. Policy arguments
can be made in many different contexts in society, especially in the
context of the legislative processes of local, state, and federal
legislatures.11 This article, however, focuses only on the use of
policy arguments by legal advocates in the context of making legal
arguments to a court of law. We saw this type of policy argument
in the interspousal immunity example above, where we discussed
how the defendant’s attorney could use a policy argument in
defending his or her client in court.
2. “. . . advances or protects a particular social value . . .”
The second part of the definition that will be examined actually
comes near the end: “A policy argument is an argument . . . that
advances or protects a particular social value implicated by the
issue.” In terms of cognitive processes, policy arguments persuade
in a very different manner than other types of legal argumentation.
Most legal arguments are based on established (and binding) legal
authority such as statutes, administrative rules, and case law.12 As
a consequence, these types of legal arguments, from a cognitive
standpoint, are based largely on principles of formal logic such as
deductive reasoning13 and analogical reasoning.14 Policy
11

See, e.g., ROBERT J. MARTINEAU & ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, JR., PLAIN
ENGLISH FOR DRAFTING STATUTES AND RULES 13–19 (2012); ROBERT J.
MARTINEAU & MICHAEL B. SALERNO, LEGAL, LEGISLATIVE, AND RULE
DRAFTING IN PLAIN ENGLISH 93 (2005); ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS 59–68 (1997).
12
See, e.g., DERNBACH ET AL., supra note 1, at 151 (“The relevant rules of
law . . . provide the framework for your analysis . . . .”); EDWARDS, supra note
1, at 17 (“The foundation of any legal analysis is the relevant rule of law.”);
HUHN, supra note 10, at 51 (“There is a fundamental difference between policy
arguments and the other four types of legal arguments [we have discussed].”);
SHAPO ET AL., supra note 1, at 113 (“Begin [legal analysis] by explaining the
controlling rule in the jurisdiction in which your problem is located.”). See
generally, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE STRUCTURE AND
LANGUAGE OF EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 38–39 (2d ed. 2007).
13
See authorities cited supra note 12. Professor Gardner’s entire book is
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arguments, on the other hand, are not based on established legal
authority15 or on processes of formal logic. Policy arguments are
instead based on an appeal to a judge’s value system.
Consider the interspousal immunity scenario, for example. In
that discussion, we assumed that we were legal advocates
defending a party from an ex-spouse in a tort suit. As a policy
argument, we argued that if the court held that interspousal
immunity was inapplicable and that the suit was allowed, the
precedent established by that ruling would encourage divorce as a
means of bypassing the interspousal immunity defense in future
tort suits between spouses. Although this argument seems logical,
it is not based on principles of formal logic. Instead, it is based on
an appeal to a judge’s value system and, more specifically, the
value the judge places on marriage as a social institution.
The unique nature of policy arguments can best be illustrated
by comparing it to rule-based, or deductive, reasoning. The formal
logic of deductive reasoning is predicated on a binding major
premise.16 Consider this famous example of a formal deductive
syllogism:17

devoted to deductive reasoning in the context of legal argument. See generally
GARDNER, supra note 12.
14
See, e.g., DERNBACH ET AL., supra note 1, at 101–05; EDWARDS, supra
note 1, at 106–12; HUHN, supra note 10, at 42–43, 119–22; SHAPO ET AL., supra
note 1, at 62–64; Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and
Dialectic Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUDIES FORUM 7, 10
(1996) [hereinafter Edwards, The Convergence].
15
Policy arguments can be based on an express statement of policy
underlying the relevant legal rule. However, this article focuses on the skill of
crafting an original policy argument rather than the skill of formulating an
argument based on an existing statement of policy. Professor Margolis also
recognized the difference between these two types of policy arguments and
similarly focused her articles on the skill of crafting novel policy arguments. See
Margolis, Beyond Brandeis, supra note 5, at 211–12; Margolis, Closing the
Floodgates, supra note 2, at 60.
16
E.g., GARDNER, supra note 12, at 4, 53–70; Anita Schnee, Logical
Reasoning “Obviously,” 3 LEG. WRITING 105, 107–08 (1997).
17
GARDNER, supra note 12, at 5.
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All men are mortal.
(MAJOR PREMISE)
Socrates is a man.
(MINOR PREMISE)
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
(CONCLUSION)

In this example, the major premise—All men are mortal—is an
undeniable truism and serves as the basis for the formal deductive
logic that follows it.18 Legal arguments based on binding
established rules also are grounded in the formal logic of deductive
reasoning. Consider this example from James A. Gardner:19
In order to be enforceable,
(MAJOR PREMISE)
a contract must be supported
by consideration.
The contract between Tim
(MINOR PREMISE)
and Mary is not supported
by consideration.
Therefore, the contract
(CONCLUSION)
between Tim and Mary
is not enforceable.
The major premise in this syllogism—that enforceable
contracts must be supported by consideration—is a rule mandated
by binding law. Thus, the conclusion is not a product of choice or
personal preference; it is product of formal deductive reasoning.20
Policy arguments function quite differently. In the interspousal
immunity example, there is no binding rule (i.e., major premise)
that states that a judge must avoid establishing rules that encourage
divorce. Consequently, the policy argument we explored is not
based on deductive reasoning flowing from an indisputable major
premise. Rather, our argument—that the court should rule in our
favor to avoid encouraging divorce on a societal scale—is based on
an effort to tap into the judge’s value for marriage as a social
institution. A judge is not required to protect marriage as an
institution, and our policy argument is only as strong as the judge’s
personal commitment to that institution.
18

See id.
Id. at 9.
20
Id. at 6–8 (discussing the “power of syllogistic reasoning”).
19
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To more fully appreciate what this means in terms of
psychology theory, we must examine the nature of values in
human cognition. According to renowned social psychologist
Milton Rokeach, a social value is “an enduring belief that a
specific . . . end-state of existence is . . . socially preferable to an
opposite or converse . . . end-state of existence.”21 Thus, in
Rokeach’s terms, a policy argument is an argument that asks a
judge to reach a conclusion that advances or protects a specific
end-state of social existence over the opposite end-state of social
existence. In terms of the interspousal immunity scenario, our
policy argument seeks to persuade the judge that an end-state of
societal existence that preserves marriages (or, at least, does not
undermine them) is preferable to an end-state of existence in which
the law actually encourages divorce as a mechanism for avoiding
interspousal immunity.
People, however, do not hold their values in a cognitive
vacuum. Rather, people possess a mental hierarchy of values in
which their more cherished values are ranked as higher in
importance than less cherished values.22 As a consequence, if a
person is forced to make a decision based on values and the issue
under analysis implicates two or more competing values, the
higher ranked value or values in the person’s personal value
hierarchy will generally control the decision.23 Thus, decisionmaking based on values is more often not a choice between either
advancing or not advancing a particular value; it is more often a
decision about which of the competing values to advance.
What’s more, a person’s hierarchy of values is personal to him
or her. The rank order of a person’s values is a product of a
lifetime of experiences and can—and often does—differ from
person to person.24 Thus, different people could reach different
conclusions when forced to decide between the same competing
21

MILTON ROKEACH, THE NATURE OF HUMAN VALUES 5 (1973). Professor
Rokeach discusses both personal values (like salvation and peace of mind) and
social values (like world peace and brotherhood). Id. at 5, 7–8. Only social
values are relevant to our discussion of policy arguments, so the definition of a
value quoted in the text has been altered accordingly.
22
Id. at 6, 14.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 6.
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values.
The concept of a hierarchical system of values is very
important to the topic of policy-based persuasion because legal
issues often implicate two or more competing values. That is, the
parties on both sides of a legal issue often have policy arguments,25
and a judge’s task is not to decide whether to advance an
individual value in isolation, but rather to decide which value
should be advanced over the other. Let’s again consider our
interspousal immunity example. As the attorney for the defendant
in this hypothetical scenario, we argued that the suit between the
ex-spouses for a marital tort should be barred because to hold
otherwise would encourage divorce as a means of getting around
interspousal immunity in future cases. The plaintiff’s counsel,
however, has competing policy arguments. The attorney for the
plaintiff can argue that barring the application of interspousal
immunity in this situation is supported by the policy of citizens
having access to the courts to resolve conflicts as well as the policy
supporting a person’s right to be compensated for injuries caused
by another person.26 Thus, a judge confronted with these
conflicting policy arguments must decide which end-state of
existence is preferable: the social state in which the rights of
legitimate claimants are sacrificed in an effort to preserve
marriages on a societal scale, or the social state in which the law
allows a person injured by a spouse to seek compensation in court
upon divorce despite any incentive to divorce such a law may
create.
Furthermore, because people’s value systems (i.e., value
hierarchies) differ, different judges could reach different
conclusions on this issue. And it is the personal nature of value
25

See, e.g., Edwards, The Convergence, supra note 14, at 14–15 (discussing
the competing policy arguments in Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1805)); Margolis, Closing the Floodgates, supra note 2, at 65 & n.34.
26
Both of these values—access to courts and compensation for injury—are
frequently used in policy-based persuasion. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI
Premier Tech., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 700, 719 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“[P]ublic policy
favors granting access to the courts and resolution of conflicts through the
adversarial system.”); Sam v. Sam, 134 P.3d 761, 768 (N.M. 2006) (“New
Mexico has a particular interest in providing compensation or access to the
courts to residents of the state.”).
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hierarchies that most poignantly differentiates policy-based
persuasion from other forms of formal legal persuasion. As we saw
earlier, deductive reasoning based on binding rules and established
facts results in consistent conclusions. By contrast, arguments
based on policy could result in different conclusions from different
judges because each judge may differ in how he or she personally
ranks the values implicated by the competing policy arguments.
3. “. . . by establishing a new rule . . .”
The third salient part of my definition of a policy argument is
the language that states, “A policy argument is an argument . . .
that urges the court to resolve the issue before it by establishing a
new rule.” It is here where principles of sociology become
relevant. A policy argument in legal advocacy goes beyond the
interests of the parties presently before the court and actually urges
the court to establish a new rule that will apply to society
generally.27
In sociology theory, the term institutionalization refers to the
process by which a value or mode of behavior is embedded into
and made a part of a social institution.28 The law itself is
commonly recognized as one of the most important and powerful

27

E.g., Margolis, Closing the Floodgates, supra note 2, at 70 (“[A]ll policy
arguments share the common attribute of advocating that a proposed legal rule
will benefit society by advancing a particular social goal or, conversely, that the
proposed legal rule will cause harm and should not be adopted.”). See also
SHAPO ET AL., supra note 1, at 264–69 (discussing policy arguments in the
context of “questions of law”).
28
See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Alexander, Analytic Debates: Understanding the
Relative Autonomy of Culture, in CULTURE AND DEBATES: CONTEMPORARY
DEBATES 1, 5–6 (Jeffery C. Alexander & Steven Seidman eds., 1990); DERIK
GELDERBLOM, SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 6–8 (2003); PHILLIP SELZNICK,
LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION 5–7, 138–39 (1984); TALCOTT PARSONS ON
INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION: SELECTED WRITINGS 115–28 (L. H.
Mayhew ed., 1982); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutional
Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340,
341 (1977); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Introduction to THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 14–15 (Walter W. Powell
and Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
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social institutions.29 In terms of the social institution that is the law
then, the process of institutionalization would refer to the act or
process of embedding a value or mode of conduct within a rule of
law, thereby putting the power of the government behind the
protection and advancement of that value or mode of conduct, at
least within the narrow area addressed by the rule.30
As we discussed previously, policy arguments seek to resolve
an issue by asking the court to establish a new rule that would
advance or protect a particular social value. Thus, in sociological
terms, a policy argument seeks to institutionalize a value by
encouraging a court to establish a new rule that would protect or
advance that value. Likewise, if the policy argument is successful,
the new rule is established for the express purpose of securing the
29

E.g., EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND
METHOD OF LAW 118 (4th ed. 1981) (“[T]he law [is] a social institution
[designed] to satisfy social wants.”) (quoting ROSCOE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 47 (1954)); Howard Erlanger et al., Is It Time for a
New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 359 (“Decades of sociolegal
scholarship have established that law is a social institution.”); Richard A.
Posner, Foreword to ESSAYS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 5, 5 (Michael Faure &
Roger Van deh Bergh eds., 1989) (“Law is a social institution of enormous
antiquity and importance.”); Donald E. Shelton, Technology and the Judiciary:
The Promise and the Challenge, 39 JUDGES’ J., no. 1, 2000, at 6, 6 (“The law is a
social institution and evolves by societal changes, not by its own instance.”).
30
For general discussions on how the law empowers some values and
disempowers others, see for example, Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court,
1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983)
(“Judges are people of violence. Because of the violence they command, judges
characteristically do not create law, but kill it. Theirs is the jurispathic office.
Confronting the luxuriant growth of a hundred legal traditions, they assert that
this one is law and destroy or try to destroy the rest.”); Christopher P. Gilkerson,
Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and
Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 865–66 (1992) (“[The law is]
both: a social institution through which people tell about their relationships with
others and with the state; and an authoritative language, or discourse, with the
power to suppress stories and experiences not articulated in accepted forms.”);
Franklin G. Snyder, Nomos, Narrative, and Adjudication: Toward a Jurisgenetic
Theory of Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1623, 1624 (1999) (discussing Cover)
(“The role of the judge . . . is purely negative. It is ‘jurispathic,’ or law-killing,
in the sense that the judge will select one of the squalling brood of conflicting
legal meanings to elevate and to enforce with the violence of the state—and will
slay the rest.”).
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value in question.
Let’s again consider the interspousal immunity example. In
that example we argued that allowing a person to sue an ex-spouse
for a tort committed during marriage would encourage divorce in
the future as a means of getting around interspousal immunity.
Thus, we argued that the court should establish a new rule that a
person cannot sue an ex-spouse for a marital tort even if the person
divorces the potential defendant prior to filing suit. By making this
argument, we were asking the court to institutionalize within the
legal institution the value of protecting marriages, at least within
this narrow context. And if our argument was successful and the
court established this new rule, the new rule would exist for the
express purpose of protecting marriage on a societal scale, even at
the sacrifice of the competing values of compensation for injuries
and access to the courts.
This aspect of policy-based persuasion—the aspect that seeks
the establishment of a new rule of law—is what differentiates
policy persuasion from a related form of legal persuasion called
narrative persuasion. Narrative persuasion, or fact-based
persuasion, occurs when a legal advocate includes facts in his or
her brief that are not relevant to the legal issue before the court but
which put the advocate’s client in a favorable light or the opposing
party in an unfavorable light.31 Narrative persuasion is designed to
motivate the decision-maker into wanting to rule in favor of the
advocate’s client or, at least, against the opposing party.32
Like policy persuasion, narrative persuasion is based on an
appeal to a judge’s values.33 In narrative persuasion, an advocate
includes facts that are designed to implicate a value reflected by
those facts. Unlike policy persuasion, however, narrative
persuasion does not seek to have that value embedded into a new
31

E.g., Kenneth D. Chestek, Competing Stories: A Case Study of the Role of
Narrative Reasoning in Judicial Decisions, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: J.
ALWD 99, 102 (2012) (citing NEUMANN, supra note 1, at 309–11; Christopher
Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 J. LEGAL
WRITING 53 (2008)). See also, e.g., SHAPO ET AL., supra note 1, at 414–19.
32
NEUMANN, supra note 1, at 309–11; Chestek, supra note 31, at 102.
33
E.g., Edwards, The Convergence, supra note 14, at 11 (“Narrative
reasoning evaluates a litigant’s story against cultural narratives and the moral
values and themes these narratives encode.”).
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rule of law. Rather, the facts are included to persuade and
influence the judge separate and apart from the law applicable to
the issue before the court.34
The case of Springham v. Kordek35 highlights the similarities
and differences between policy-based persuasion and narrative
persuasion. In my prior writings, I summarized the facts of
Springham as follows:36
In Springham, the adult surviving children of an
abandoned mother sued their estranged father after
he attempted, following his wife’s death, to sell the
family home and retain all of the proceeds. The
facts of the case showed that the father had
abandoned his wife and four minor children years
earlier and that the children, upon reaching
adulthood, helped their mother make the mortgage
payments on her home. The mortgage on the home
was in the names of both the mother and the father;
thus, the children’s efforts to avoid foreclosure
benefitted both their mother and their absentee
father. After the mother died, the father reentered
the scene to claim the property and to sell it. The
children then filed suit to enjoin the father’s sale of
the property and to impose a lien on the property as
subrogees for the mortgage payments they had
made.
The trial court ruled in favor of the father, and
the children appealed. The main issue on appeal
was whether the children had gained rights as
subrogees or whether they had acted as mere
“volunteers” or “intermeddlers,” who were not
entitled to rights of subrogation. The appellate court
reversed the trial court and held that the children did
acquire lien rights under Maryland’s law of
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NEUMANN, supra note 1, at 309–11; SHAPO ET AL., supra note 1, at 414–
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36
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subrogation.37
During the appeal, the children’s attorney, in addition to
arguing the relevant law of subrogation, had the opportunity to
engage in narrative persuasion by including facts that portrayed the
father as being ungrateful for the children’s efforts in saving his
home from foreclosure. By including and highlighting facts
regarding the father’s surprisingly callous attitude toward the
children, the attorney could activate the appellate judges’ values
for gratefulness and appreciativeness and, in so doing, tacitly
motivate the court to root against the father in the final resolution
of the legal issue.
The appellate briefs for the Springham case are not available
on electronic databases, so we can’t know for sure if the attorney
for the children engaged in this type of persuasion in the brief to
the court. What we do know is that the court was significantly
motivated by these facts to view the father in a less-than-favorable
light. In fact, genuine animus toward the father is reflected in
several places in the court’s published opinion. Judge Solomon
Liss began his opinion for the court with a biting literary reference
to Shakespeare’s King Lear:
Shakespeare, in his tragedy “King Lear,” portrayed
the bitterness of a parent plagued by ungrateful
children. In Act I, IV 283, Lear laments,
Ingratitude, thou marble hearted
fiend,
More hideous, when thou shows’t
thee in a child,
Than the sea monster.
And again, in Act I, IV 312, Lear cries out,
How sharper than a serpent’s tooth it
is
To have a thankless child.
This case illustrates that ingratitude is not the sole
prerogative of ungrateful children.38
Later in the opinion, the court addresses the father’s claim that
the children acted as intermeddlers who “interfered with his
37
38

Id. at 92–93.
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liability for the debt.”39 Responding to this claim with incredulity
and dismay toward the father, the opinion states:
The appellee perhaps gives his children less credit
than they deserve. It is obvious that they knew that
by making the mortgage payments they protected
not only their mother but their father as well. To
suggest that the father has shown less than the
minimum of gratitude which might be expected is to
state the obvious.40
It comes as no surprise to the readers of the opinion that the
court, in the end, decided against the father and in favor of the
children’s rights as subrogees.41 To the extent that the law of
subrogation was ambiguous on the issues before the court, it is safe
to assume that the court was motivated by the facts of the case to
resolve those ambiguities in favor of the children.
While the Springham case shows how narrative persuasion can
be a powerful tool of advocacy, it also demonstrates how narrative
persuasion differs from policy persuasion. The attorney for the
children in this case had the opportunity to use facts to activate
values favorable to his clients. However, the attorney was not in a
position to seek to institutionalize those values in a new rule of
law. That is, the attorney could not advocate that there should be a
separate rule under the law of subrogation for subrogors who act in
an ungrateful manner. The father’s conduct was not legally
relevant to the issues of subrogation law before the court, and the
court did not expressly rule in the children’s favor based on the
father’s ingratitude. Rather, these facts worked behind the scenes
to motivate the court to rule against the father.
Policy-based persuasion, in contrast, uses values in a more
overt manner. A policy argument not only activates a judge’s
values, but also asks the judge to institutionalize those values in a
new rule of law. Thus, while both policy-based persuasion and
narrative persuasion rely on an appeal to values, they differ
dramatically from a sociological standpoint. Only in policy-based
persuasion does an advocate seek to create new law in an effort to
39
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advance or protect the implicated values.
Further blurring the line between policy-based persuasion and
narrative persuasion is the fact that a single value can serve as the
basis for both types of advocacy. Consider, for example, the value
of fairness. Fairness commonly serves as the basis for narrative
persuasion, as advocates often have an opportunity to incorporate
in their briefs facts that may not be relevant to the legal issue
before the court but which nevertheless demonstrate the unfairness
of the opposing party’s conduct or position. We can see the use of
the value of fairness in narrative persuasion in the Springham case
discussed above. While the court chose to characterize the father’s
behavior toward his children in terms of the more specific concept
of ungratefulness, the court could have just as easily described the
father’s behavior in terms of the more general concept of
unfairness. To be sure, the father in Springham acted unfairly when
he ungratefully sought to divest his children of any interest in the
family home after they had single-handedly saved the home from
foreclosure. And while the unfairness of the father’s conduct was
not relevant to the issues of subrogation law facing the Springham
court, these facts and the general value of fairness they invoked
worked behind the scenes to motivate the court to rule against the
father on the real legal issue presented in the case.
The value of fairness, however, can also underlie policy-based
persuasion. Consider, for example, the case of Ahtna Tene Nene v.
Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game.42 One of the issues in the Ahtna
case was whether a pro se litigant (named Manning) who had
graduated from law school but who had not become a member of
the Alaska state bar could collect attorney fees for his own work in
the litigation.43 The party opposing the award of attorney’s fees
had the opportunity to argue, in addition to other arguments, a
policy argument based on fairness: that it would be unfair to allow
a person to take advantage of the benefits of being a lawyer when
that person is not subject to the burdens associated with being a
lawyer.44 The Alaska Supreme Court found the policy of fairness
42
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to be persuasive and expressly included it as one of the court’s
rationales for its holding that pro se law graduates who are not
members of the state bar cannot collect attorney’s fees:
Moreover, the policy rationales for denying fee
awards to lay pro se litigants apply equally to law
school graduates who are not licensed to practice.
...
[Manning] does not pay bar dues . . .,
is not subject to the Alaska Rules of
Professional Conduct, is not subject
to the Alaska Bar Rules, does not
maintain a year round legal staff . . .
or law office . . ., does not carry legal
malpractice insurance, does not have
an IOLTA account [Interest on
Lawyers Trust Account], does not
provide pro bono services to the
indigent, is not available for
Administrative Rule 12 legal
assignments, and does not serve on
discipline, fee arbitration, or other
committees or volunteer programs
within the Alaska Bar Association.
Allowing Manning to reap the benefits of being
a lawyer, including the ability to recover fees,
without taking on the obligations and
responsibilities of being a lawyer is fundamentally
unfair.45
This quote shows that the Alaska Supreme Court expressly
based its holding, at least in part, on the value of fairness.
Consistent with policy-based persuasion and policy-based
decision-making, the value of fairness did not merely operate
behind the scenes in Ahtna. Instead, the court institutionalized the
value of fairness as a component of the court’s newly established

7449957. Although the attorney did not argue fairness expressly, he did argue
the facts that served as the basis for the court’s ruling in this regard. See id.
45
Ahtna, 288 P.3d at 462–63 (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting the superior court).
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rule of law. Thus, the Ahtna case demonstrates that policy
arguments can be based on the value of fairness.46 More important
for the present discussion, however, the juxtaposition of the Ahtna
case with the Springham case shows how policy-based persuasion
based on the value of fairness differs substantially from narrative
persuasion based on the value of fairness.
II. TYPES OF POLICY ARGUMENTS
The previous literature on policy arguments in legal
advocacy discusses a four-category organizational scheme.47 This
categorization is based on the types of values implicated by policy
arguments. Professors Helene S. Shapo, Marilyn R. Walter, and
Elizabeth Fajans offer this summary:
Policy arguments can be categorized in many ways,
but one useful system is to divide them into four
basic groups: normative arguments, that is,
arguments about shared values and goals that the
law should promote; economic arguments, which
look at the economic consequences of a rule;
institutional competence arguments, that is
structural arguments about the proper relationship
of courts to other courts and courts to other
branches of government; and judicial administration
arguments, arguments about the practical effects of
a ruling on the administration of justice.48
This list of types of policy arguments is useful in brief writing
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is applicable to narrative persuasion only); Edwards, The Convergence, supra
note 14, at 16–17 (same).
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as a reminder of the types of arguments legal advocates should
consider in crafting their briefs. However, this organizational
scheme is less helpful from a cognitive psychology standpoint
because there is no evidence that any one of these categories is
cognitively more persuasive than any other. Thus, I will offer an
alternative organizational scheme for policy arguments from a
cognitive perspective.
In terms of cognitive processes, policy arguments can be
divided into two main categories: (1) Policy Arguments Based on
Future Implications Only, and (2) Policy Arguments Based on
Present and Future Implications. The significance of these
categories will become evident in Part III of this article, where we
will explore strategies for improving the effectiveness of policybased persuasion.
A. Policy Arguments Based on Future Implications Only
The first category covers policy arguments that are designed to
protect the implicated social value in the future, but which are not
designed to protect that value in the case presently before the court.
These types of policy arguments tacitly recognize that it is too late
to protect the value in the present case and instead seek to protect
that value in the future through the establishment of a new rule of
law. Let’s consider some examples:
1. The interspousal immunity example (from the defendant’s
perspective) - As you will recall, previously I posited the
hypothetical issue of whether interspousal immunity should bar a
suit between divorced spouses for a tort committed during the
marriage of the parties. In that context, we first explored a policy
argument for the defending party. As attorneys for the defendant,
we argued that the court should bar this type of suit because if it
were allowed, divorce would be encouraged in the future as a
means of getting around interspousal immunity.49 This argument,
in the resolution of the hypothetical present case, advocates for a
new rule that would protect marriages in the future. Obviously, this
argument is not designed to protect the marriage of the parties in
49
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the present case. The parties have already divorced, and there is
nothing the court could do to prevent that short of traveling back in
time. Thus, this policy argument focuses on the future only; it asks
the court to resolve the present case by establishing a rule that
would protect the institution of marriage in the future.
2. Klinger v. Adams County School District and the definition
of “expenses” - The second example of a “future implications
only” policy argument comes from the case of Klinger v. Adams
County School District. 50 In Klinger, a teacher violated a Colorado
statute that requires public school teachers to give the employing
school district written notice of termination at least 30 days prior to
the beginning of a new school year.51 If a teacher gives late notice,
the statute authorizes the school district to withhold from the
teacher’s final paycheck the “expenses” incurred by the district in
hiring a replacement teacher.52 After Ms. Klinger gave a late notice
of termination to the Adams County School District, the District
asked some salaried employees to allocate some of their time to the
task of hiring a replacement for Ms. Klinger.53 After a replacement
teacher was hired, the School District determined the monetary
value of the reallocated salaried-employees’ time and deducted that
amount from Ms. Klinger’s final paycheck.54 The issue addressed
by the Colorado Supreme Court in this case was whether the term
“expenses” in the statute includes only out-of-pocket expenditures
or whether it also includes the monetary value of reallocated
salaried-employees time.55
In addressing this issue, the attorneys for the School District
argued that the term “expenses” should be interpreted to include
employee time for policy reasons. The attorneys argued that the
statutory term should be interpreted broadly—i.e., that it should
include more expenses rather than less—so that the provision
would serve as a strong deterrent against teachers giving late
50
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notices of termination in the future.56 The attorneys for the School
District explained that late notices and the resulting late hiring
processes undermine the state’s school districts’ ability to offer
quality education to students in several ways: first, late hiring
involves a depleted pool of less-qualified applicants; second, late
hiring distracts the other teachers from preparing for the new
school year; and third, teachers hired late in the process are less
prepared for the start of new school year.57
The School District’s policy argument can be characterized as
a “future implications only” policy argument because the
argument’s goal of protecting education applies to the future only.
Obviously, a broad interpretation of the statutory word “expenses”
could not deter Ms. Klinger herself from giving a late notice of
termination. She had already given a late notice, and the
consequences of that late notice were already incurred by the
School District. Thus, the School District’s policy argument did
not seek to protect the educational process from Ms. Klinger’s
conduct specifically; the argument called for the court to resolve
Ms. Klinger’s case by establishing a new rule that would protect
education in the future.
3. Smith v. United States and “using a firearm” - The case of
Smith v. United States58 involved a federal criminal statute that
enhances a criminal’s punishment if he or she “uses . . . a firearm”
during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime.59 In that case, the
defendant, Smith, used a firearm as an item of barter when he
attempted to trade the firearm to an undercover officer in exchange
for drugs.60 The issue before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the statutory phrase “uses . . . a firearm” applies only to
56
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using a firearm as a weapon or whether it also includes using a
firearm as an item of barter.61 The prosecuting attorney argued,
among other things, that the phrase in question should be
interpreted broadly for the policy reasons of citizen safety and
violence prevention. More specifically, the prosecuting attorney
argued that the presence of a gun at a drug deal injects an element
of dangerousness into the situation even if the gun is there as an
item of trade. Consequently, the prosecuting attorney argued that
the phrase “use a firearm” should be interpreted broadly to
discourage drug dealers from taking firearms to drug
transactions.62 The Supreme Court agreed with the prosecution and
upheld Smith’s conviction under the firearms statute.63
The prosecutor’s policy argument in Smith was a “future
implications only” policy argument. The prosecutor argued that the
Court should uphold Smith’s conviction in order to set a precedent
that would discourage future behavior. The argument was not
designed to deter Smith himself from taking a gun to a drug
transaction. He had already done that. Thus, the argument’s goal
was to have the Court resolve the present case based on the
precedent the case could establish and the impact that precedent
would have on the future.
4. The “closing the floodgates” example - The final example of
a “future implications only” policy argument highlights how
common and widespread these types of policy arguments are in
legal advocacy. I refer to the popular “floodgates of litigation”
policy argument.64 As Professor Margolis explains,
[t]his argument asserts that the proposed rule, if
adopted, will inundate the court with lawsuits. This
may occur because the proposed rule is confusing,
overly broad, or the problem it addresses is
61
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extremely common. According to this argument, the
“flood” of litigation would overwhelm the courts
and lead to inefficient use of the courts’ valuable
time and resources.65
The “floodgates of litigation” policy argument is also a “future
implications only” policy argument. When an advocate makes this
argument, the advocate is encouraging a court to issue a ruling that
will prevent a flood of litigation in the future. Obviously, the court
cannot prevent the present litigation because it already exists.
Thus, the argument asks the court to establish a rule that will
protect judicial resources from future cases only.
B. Policy Arguments Based on Present and Future Implications
The second category of policy arguments covers policy
arguments that apply both to the case presently before the court as
well as to future cases on the same issue. As we saw, policy
arguments that fall under the previous category focus exclusively
on the precedent that the present case can establish and the
potential impact of that precedent in the future. Policy arguments
that fall under this second category function very differently; they
focus on both the present and the future. In terms of the present,
these types of policy arguments explain how a particular social
value dictates a result in the case presently before the court. In
terms of the future, these types of policy arguments rely on the
idea that a favorable ruling in the present case will establish a
precedent that will continue to protect the implicated social value
going forward. Here are three examples:
1. The interspousal immunity example (from the plaintiff’s
perspective) - In the previous section, we saw how the policy
argument for the defendant in the interspousal immunity example
qualifies as a “future implications only” policy argument.66 By
contrast, the policy arguments for the plaintiff on that same issue
can be characterized as “present and future implications” policy
arguments. Recall that the issue we explored in this hypothetical
65
66
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scenario was whether interspousal immunity should bar a suit
between divorced spouses for a tort committed during the marriage
of the parties. In this context, we explored two policy arguments
that the plaintiff could raise. First, from the perspective of the
plaintiff, we argued that the immunity doctrine should not apply
and the suit should be allowed because of the policy that favors
allowing citizens to have access to the court system to resolve
grievances. Second, we argued that the suit should be allowed
because of the policy that supports compensating a person who is
injured by the tortious conduct of another.67
Unlike with “future implications only” policy arguments, these
arguments for the plaintiff have implications for the present case as
well as future cases. Clearly, the present plaintiff would like access
to the courts to seek compensation for his or her injuries. And if a
court was persuaded by these policy arguments and held that a
divorced spouse could sue an ex-spouse for a martial tort, this
ruling would enable the present plaintiff to do just that. In terms of
the future, the ruling would serve as a precedential rule of law that
would apply to future cases. This new rule would institutionalize
the values of access to the courts and compensation for the injured
in this limited context and would guarantee the right to sue in like
cases in the future. Thus, whereas the “future implications only”
policy arguments we explored in the previous section sought to
protect or advance a social value in the future only, “present and
future implications” policy arguments have relevance and
applicability to the case at hand as well as to future cases on the
same issue.
2. Ahtna Tene Nene v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game - Earlier,
we discussed the Ahtna case, where the issue before the Alaska
Supreme Court was whether attorney fees could be awarded to a
pro se litigant who graduated from law school but who was not a
member of the state bar.68 In that example, we explored a policy
argument raised by the party advocating against the attorney’s fees.
That policy argument was based on the value of fairness and
asserted that it would be “fundamentally unfair” to allow a person
67
68
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to collect fees as an attorney when that person is not subject to the
duties and responsibilities of bar membership.69 This policy
argument can also be characterized as a “present and future
implications” policy argument. The policy argument was used to
convince the court to establish a rule that denied attorney’s fees to
the law graduate in that case.70 The ruling in the Ahtna case,
however, also established a precedent that will prevent the
recovery of attorney’s fees by similarly-situated law graduates in
the future. Thus, the policy argument had implications on the case
presently before the court as well as on future cases involving the
same issue.
3. Constitutional civil rights cases and Illinois v. Caballes71 Most policy arguments in cases involving constitutional civil rights
can also be classified as “present and future implications” policy
arguments. This is true because most issues of constitutional rights
are resolved based on policy considerations,72 and the policy
considerations are typically applicable to the present litigants as
well as future similarly-situated litigants. By way of example, let’s
consider the case of Illinois v. Caballes.
In Caballes, a criminal defendant sought to have evidence of
illegal drugs found in his automobile excluded from his
prosecution based on the assertion that it was obtained during an
illegal search.73 The facts showed that police pulled Caballes over
for a traffic violation and, without suspicion of drug use, used a
drug-sniffing dog from outside the automobile to smell for drugs
within the automobile.74 The dog detected the scent of drugs, and a
subsequent physical search of the interior of the automobile
revealed drugs.75 The issue before the United States Supreme
69
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Court was whether the use of a drug-sniffing dog from outside of a
vehicle when there is no suspicion of drug use amounts to a
violation of the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches.76
In addition to arguing by analogy based on prior Fourth
Amendment precedent, the parties for both sides had the ability to
argue policy. The policy underlying the prosecution’s position, as
is true for all unreasonable search cases, was the value of
protecting society from criminal behavior.77 The policy for the
defense, not surprisingly, was based on the values of privacy and
citizen protection from governmental intrusion.78 The policy
arguments for both the defense and the prosecution can be
classified as “present and future implications” policy arguments
because they had relevance to Caballes’ case specifically as well as
to future cases on the same issue. For example, from the
defendant’s perspective, the search infringed upon Caballes’
privacy rights, and a favorable decision by the Court would protect
those rights by excluding the incriminating evidence from
Caballes’ prosecution. The favorable ruling would also protect the
value of privacy in the future by establishing a precedent that
would discourage police officers from this type of conduct.
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the search was legal
and that the evidence obtained in the search could be used in
Caballes’ prosecution.79 Thus, the policy of protecting society
against criminal conduct had implications on the case at bar, as the
evidence was used to convict Caballes and society was thereby
protected from his conduct. The policy also applies to the future
through the precedent that the Caballes case established. In fact, a
case with nearly identical facts arose only two months later in the
76
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Seventh Circuit. Not surprisingly, that case, United States v.
Johnson,80 was decided in favor of the prosecution based on the
new rule established in Caballes.
As Caballes demonstrates, policy arguments in cases involving
constitutional civil rights almost always have relevance to the
instant case as well as to the future. Thus, policy arguments in
these types of cases can readily be characterized as “present and
future implications” policy arguments. The frequency of
constitutional civil rights cases alone demonstrates how common
this second category of policy arguments is in legal advocacy.
III. MAXIMIZING THE PERSUASIVE IMPACT OF POLICY ARGUMENTS
IN LEGAL ADVOCACY
The first two parts of this article explained the general nature
of policy-based persuasion in terms of sociology theory and
cognitive psychology theory. This part explores specific strategies
legal advocates can employ to improve the effectiveness of their
policy arguments in their briefs. As we will see, social science
theory, especially cognitive psychology theory, offers many
insights into the human mind that can help advocates maximize the
persuasive impact of policy arguments. The strategies discussed in
this section are organized around the four most important cognitive
processes relevant to policy-based persuasion: (A) the fear of
future loss; (B) the assessment of probability; (C) the assessment
of importance; and (D) memory.
A. Take Advantage of the Fear of Future Loss
Several cognitive phenomena, when considered together,
suggest that policy arguments that focus primarily on future
implications are more persuasive than policy arguments that focus
on present implications. The processes at play here are the
following:


The Uncertainty Effect: The uncertainty effect refers to
80
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the tendency of people, when deciding between
alternatives, to avoid options that reflect uncertainty.81


Status Quo Bias: Status quo bias refers to the strong
tendency of people to prefer the status quo over
change.82



The Mere Exposure Effect: The mere exposure effect
refers to the tendency of people to prefer things with
which they are familiar over things with which they are
less familiar.83 This effect is similar to status quo
bias.84

All three of these processes include an element of fear. The
uncertainty effect, for example, reflects a fear of uncertainty and
unpredictability. Likewise, the related processes of status quo bias
and the mere exposure effect reflect fears of change and
unfamiliarity, respectively.
Fear is also integral to policy-based persuasion. As we
explored in Part I, policy arguments are based on the assertion that
a decision for the advocate will result in the betterment of society,
a societal gain if you will. The corollary to this notion is that the
81
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failure to implement the advocate’s policy will result in a societal
loss. Thus, underlying all policy arguments is a fear of loss to
society and a corresponding desire to avoid that loss.
Recall that in Part II of this article we explored two primary
types of policy arguments: “future implications only” policy
arguments and “present and future implications” policy arguments.
While both of these types of policy arguments invoke a fear of
loss, the three cognitive phenomena discussed above suggest that
policy arguments that warn against future loss are more persuasive
than policy arguments that warn against immediate loss. For one
thing, “future implications only” policy arguments, by definition,
focus on the future and, as such, trigger the fear of uncertainty and
unpredictability. The consequences warned of in a “future
implications only” policy argument will occur only in the future
and, thus, are imbued with the uncertainty that accompanies all
future predictions. By contrast, “present and future implications”
policy arguments focus on consequences that will occur in the
present case as well as in the future. The “present” consequences
will occur immediately upon the judge’s decision and, thus, are
known and predictable. And even though the ruling, as precedent,
would also impact the future, the future impact is predictable as
well because it is the same as the present impact. Thus, the
uncertainty effect suggests that policy arguments that warn of
future loss only are more motivating and persuasive than policy
arguments that are based on an immediate impact.
Status quo bias and the mere exposure effect also suggest that
in the context of policy-based persuasion, the fear of future loss is
more persuasive than the fear of immediate loss. The future
negative consequences warned of in a “future implications only”
policy argument represent more change and unfamiliarity than the
negative consequences underlying a “present and future
implications” policy argument. The negative consequences of a
“present and future implications” policy argument are more readily
envisioned by and comprehendible to a judge because those
consequences would occur immediately upon the judge’s decision.
Conversely, the negative consequences underlying a “future
implications only” policy argument are less appreciable to a judge
because those consequences would occur only in the more distant
future. By virtue of their temporal proximity, the consequences of
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a “present and future implications” policy argument seem more
natural and familiar than consequences that would take place only
in the future. Moreover, because future potential consequences
seem less familiar, they represent a more dramatic change from the
status quo than more easily envisioned changes that would take
effect immediately.
By way of example, let’s again consider the interspousal
immunity hypothetical. In that example, we considered the issue
of whether interspousal immunity should bar a suit between
divorced spouses for a tort committed while the parties were
married. As you will recall, the defendant’s policy argument on
this issue was a “future implications only” policy argument: that
allowing this suit would establish a precedent that would
encourage divorce in the future as a means of avoiding interspousal
immunity. One the other side of the issue, the plaintiff had “present
and future implications” policy arguments: that the suit should be
allowed to protect citizens’ rights to compensation and access to
the courts.
The phenomenon of the uncertainty effect suggests that most
judges would be more motivated to avoid the unpredictable future
consequences underlying the defendant’s policy argument than
they would be to avoid the more predictable immediate
consequences underlying the plaintiff’s policy argument. Status
quo bias and the mere exposure effect suggest the same thing. The
social state of an ex-spouse being denied access to the court
system, which would happen immediately upon the court’s ruling
to that effect, is easily imagined and tangible to a judge. And even
though such a ruling for the defendant would also impact the
future, the future impact is also imaginable because it is the same
as the present impact: the denial of court access to legitimate
claimants. By contrast, the prospect of a future social state in
which the law encourages divorce seems like an unfamiliar, scary,
and distant change to the social landscape. And this prospect is
even scarier because the impact would occur in the future only.
Because the threatened impact is not relevant to the instant case,
the impact is left only to the imagination. Thus, these cognitive
phenomena suggest that in the context of the interspousal
immunity example, the defendant’s “future implications only”
policy argument would be more persuasive to a judge than the
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plaintiff’s “present and future implications” policy arguments
because most people would be more motivated to avoid the future
negative consequence than the immediate negative consequences.
Given a choice then, it seems that advocates would be better
off trying to construct their policy arguments as “future
implications only” policy arguments rather than “present and
future implications” policy arguments. Sometimes, however, an
advocate does not have a choice between these two types of policy
arguments because some legal issues lend themselves only to
“present and future implications” policy arguments. When this is
the case, an advocate would be well advised in arguing the
“present and future implications” policy argument to emphasize
the potential impacts of the court’s decision on the future. In fact,
an advocate in this situation may want to consider explaining how
the decision in the present case could begin a slippery slope85 of
increasingly bad consequences in the future. By way of example,
let’s take another look at the Illinois v. Caballes case.
Recall that in Caballes, the United States Supreme Court was
confronted with the issue of whether a dog sniff by a police dog
from outside of a vehicle constitutes an illegal search under the
Fourth Amendment.86 Recall further that the defendant in this case
had a “present and future implications” policy argument based on
the value of privacy.87 In an effort to take advantage of the “fear of
future loss” cognitive phenomenon, the attorney for the defendant
could have stressed the possible future negative consequences that
could flow from a decision allowing this type of police conduct. In
fact, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg employed this exact strategy in
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her dissenting opinion in Caballes. In her effort to explain why the
value of privacy dictated a result for the defendant, Justice
Ginsburg emphasized the scary future that would result from a
favorable decision for the prosecution:
Today’s decision . . . clears the way for
suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug sweeps of
parked cars along sidewalks and in parking lots. . . .
Nor would motorists have constitutional grounds for
complaint should police with dogs, stationed at long
traffic lights, circle cars waiting for the red signal to
turn green.88
This quote from Justice Ginsburg reflects an important
advocacy strategy. In a policy argument that had implications for
the present case, Justice Ginsburg nevertheless primarily focused
on the future. Her argument was designed to tap into the human
fear of future loss by stressing the negative consequences the case
could spawn in all of our futures.
B. Increase the Perception of the Probability of the
Consequences
The second group of advocacy strategies revolves around the
assessment of probability. As we saw in Part I, all policy
arguments focus on how the court’s decision will have
consequences for a particular social value. And while the
immediate consequences are certain in a “present and future
implications” policy argument, the asserted consequences are only
speculative in a “future implications only” policy argument. It
necessarily follows, then, that proving the probability of the
asserted consequences is integral to this kind of policy argument.
What’s more, in the preceding section on the fear of future loss, we
saw that even with “present and future implications” policy
arguments, an advocate will often explore the possible additional
“slippery slope” negative consequences that could flow from the
court’s decision in the present case. In these situations too, then,
proving the probability of the asserted consequences is integral to
the argument. Thus, for both types of policy arguments, proving
88
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the probability of asserted consequences can be crucial. In this
section, we will explore specific strategies by which an advocate
can increase in the audience’s mind the perception that a certain
consequence underlying a policy argument is more probable.
1. Cite Non-Legal Materials That Help Prove the Probability
of the Asserted Consequences
The first strategy for improving the perceived probability of the
consequences asserted in a policy argument is to cite non-legal
materials that support the assertion. Professor Margolis wrote two
articles about the strategy of citing non-legal materials for policy
arguments in briefs.89 While Professor Margolis did not render this
advice specifically in the context of proving probability, her
advice, nevertheless, is particularly relevant here. According to
Professor Margolis’ general advice, a legal advocate can increase
the effectiveness of a policy argument by citing non-legal materials
for factual assertions that underlie the argument.90 Examples of
non-legal materials include such things as scientific studies,
economic data, history scholarship, medical reports, social science
studies, and news of current events.91
Non-legal materials such as those listed above can often be
used to prove the probability of a consequence underlying a policy
argument. Consider, for example, our interspousal immunity
hypothetical. As the defendant in that hypothetical, we argued that
the court should bar a suit between divorced spouses for a tort
committed during marriage because to hold otherwise would
encourage divorce in the future as a way of getting around the
interspousal immunity defense. This “future implications only”
policy argument is based on the assertion that future injured
spouses would opt to get divorced in order to be able to sue the
other spouse for compensation. But that argument begs the
question: what is the probability that a married person would
89
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actually terminate his or her marriage merely for the right to
receive compensation for injuries? In an effort to enhance the
perceived probability of this consequence, we, as attorneys for the
defendant, could cite sociological studies that show that financial
issues and concerns are a leading cause of divorce among
Americans.92 Such studies would help us demonstrate the
likelihood that, given a choice, a significant percentage of future
injured spouses would choose the option of divorce and financial
recovery over the alternative option of marriage and
uncompensated injury.
Professor Margolis’ scholarship provides another example:
[I]n a case in which the court is asked to impose tort
liability on a mother for injury to a child caused by
the mother’s negligent conduct during pregnancy,
the mother may argue that a duty to a fetus would
be unduly intrusive because it would affect every
moment of a woman’s life, even before pregnancy
(the policy argument). As support, she may provide
medical information . . . about the many ways a
woman’s conduct before and during pregnancy,
such as diet, physical activity and choice of work,
could affect the health of a fetus.93
Although Professor Margolis did not phrase it as such, this
excerpt is an illustration of how an advocate can enhance the
perceived probability of the consequences underlying a “present
and future implications” policy argument. The policy argument is
based on the value of privacy and the desire to be free from
unwanted intrusion into one’s life. This argument can be
characterized as a “present and future implications” policy
argument because the value of privacy applies to the instant mother
as well as future mothers. Professor Margolis’ policy argument,
however, comports with our earlier advice and focuses primarily
on the future “slippery slope” consequences that could result from
92
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a decision in the present case. In this context, Professor Margolis
explains how citing medical reports can enhance the
persuasiveness of this argument. Phrased in terms of our
discussion, the use of such non-legal materials can help prove the
likelihood (i.e., probability) that the court’s recognition of this new
legal duty of the mother in the present case would lead to the
asserted future negative consequences.
A real-life example of the use of non-legal materials to prove
the probability of a threatened consequence in a policy argument
can be seen in Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s majority opinion in
Smith v. United States94 Recall that the issue in Smith was whether
the statutory phrase “uses . . . a firearm” in relation to a drug deal
includes using a gun as an item of barter.95 In answering that
question in the affirmative, Justice O’Connor relied on the policy
argument that guns at drug deals—even guns intended as
consideration—can lead to violence. To prove the probability of
her assertion, Justice O’Connor cited The American Enterprise, a
non-legal source:
When Congress enacted the current version of [this
statute], it was no doubt aware that drugs and guns
are a dangerous combination. In 1989, 56 percent of
all murders in New York City were drug related;
during the same period, the figure for the Nation’s
Capital was as high as 80 percent. The American
Enterprise 100 (Jan.-Feb. 1991).96
As these three illustrations demonstrate, one way a legal
advocate can enhance the perceived probability of the threatened
consequences underlying a policy argument is to cite non-legal
sources that help demonstrate the likelihood of those
consequences. Such use of non-legal materials can significantly
strengthen a policy argument by proving to the reader that the
threatened impact on future society is a real possibility.
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2. Combine more extreme, less likely consequences with less
extreme, more likely consequences: The Conjunction
Fallacy
Advocates will often want to include highly extreme and
dramatic consequences in their future-oriented policy arguments.
Unfortunately, as a general rule, the more extreme a consequence
is, the less probable it seems. To overcome this dilemma, an
advocate should consider combining the more dramatic
consequence with a less dramatic, yet more likely, consequence.
Cognitive studies in probability assessment show that most
people will consider the occurrence of a highly unlikely
circumstance to be more probable when it is linked to a more likely
circumstance. This is a cognitive phenomenon known as the
conjunction fallacy.97 The conjunction fallacy is best illustrated by
a famous study by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. In this
study, participants were asked to read the following description of
a person named Linda:
Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and
very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a
student, she was deeply concerned with the issues
of discrimination and social justice, and also
participated in antinuclear demonstrations.98
The participants were then asked,
Which alternative is more probable?
1. Linda is a bank teller.
2. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist
movement.99
Before you read on, take a minute and answer this question
yourself.
During the many times this study was repeated, between
97
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eighty-five and ninety percent of the participants consistently
chose option 2 as being more probable.100 You may have even
chosen option 2 yourself. Mathematically, however, option 1 is
more probable because the probability of two events happening is
always less than the probability of only one of the two happening.
While it may seem likely based on her description that Linda is a
feminist, it is much less likely that she is both a feminist and a
bank teller than just a bank teller.101 This common miscalculation
of probability is a manifestation of the conjunction fallacy.
Because Linda being a “feminist” seems likely, the human mind
automatically chooses the option containing that quality even
though that quality is conjoined with a less likely circumstance
(being a bank teller). Thus, the chance of Linda being a bank teller
seems more likely when it is linked to a more probable
circumstance.102
Resourceful legal advocates can use this cognitive
phenomenon to their advantage in policy-based persuasion. When
explaining the potential negative consequences of a future-oriented
policy argument, advocates should link more extreme
consequences with less extreme consequences. This combination
often will trigger the conjunction fallacy and cause the audience to
view the extreme consequences as more probable than those
consequences would seem if they were presented in isolation. We
can see this strategy in action in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in the
Illinois v. Caballes case. Recall that in arguing in favor of privacy
rights and against the majority’s decision to allow police to use
drug-sniffing dogs on the outside of an automobile without
100
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suspicion of the driver’s drug possession, Justice Ginsburg warned
of slippery-slope consequences that could follow from the
majority’s decision:
Today’s decision . . . clears the way for
suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug sweeps of
parked cars along sidewalks and in parking lots. . . .
Nor would motorists have constitutional grounds for
complaint should police with dogs, stationed at long
traffic lights, circle cars waiting for the red signal to
turn green.103
Whether Justice Ginsburg did it purposefully or not, her
compelling statement gets much of its power from the conjunction
fallacy. The predication that police with dogs will patrol traffic
lights after the Caballes decision would seem too extreme and
improbable if it was presented in isolation. However, by
combining it with the more likely consequence of police using
dogs in parking lots, Justice Ginsburg’s statement triggers the
conjunction fallacy and, thereby, makes the more extreme
consequence seem more probable.
3. Provide vivid and easily imaginable examples of future
consequences: The Availability Heuristic
The last probability strategy we will discuss involves a
cognitive phenomenon called the availability heuristic. According
to the availability heuristic, people have a tendency in evaluating
probability to view events or circumstances that they can readily
imagine from their past experiences as being more probable than
events and circumstances that have less relevance to their past
experiences.104 “According to this heuristic principle, one basis for
the judgment of the likelihood of an uncertain outcome is cognitive
availability; that is, the ease with which this outcome can be
pictured or constructed. The more available an outcome is, the
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more likely it is perceived to be.”105 In short, the availability
heuristic is the process of judging probability by “the ease with
which instances come to mind.”106
Legal advocates can take advantage of the availability heuristic
by including vivid, easily-imaginable examples when describing
the future consequences underlying a policy argument. We can see
this strategy also at work in the quote from Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent in the Caballes case discussed in the prior section. Note
that both of the warned consequences—dog patrols in parking lots
and dog patrols at traffic lights—are vivid and easily imaginable
because we all encounter these locations on a regular basis. The
ease with which these locations come to mind enhances the
perceived probability of these consequences becoming a reality.
Justice Ginsburg’s argument, by contrast, would not have been as
persuasive had she warned of dog patrols in less common—and,
therefore, less cognitively available—locations, such as the
holding deck of an automobile ferry or the police automobile
impound lot.107
C. Increase the Perception of the Importance of the
Consequences
In Part I, we saw that policy arguments are based on an appeal
to a judge’s values. It necessarily follows then that the strength of a
policy argument depends largely on how important the judge
considers the value implicated by the argument. We also saw that
most questions of law implicate policy considerations on both
sides of the issue and that the more important value according to
the judge’s personal hierarchy of values will generally control the
decision to the sacrifice of the competing value or values. Thus,
the cognitive processes for assessing importance, and specifically
105
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the cognitive processes for assessing the importance of a value, are
critical to policy-based persuasion. In this section we will explore
strategies by which a legal advocate can enhance in the judge’s
mind the perceived importance of a value implicated by a policy
argument.
It is important to note that some social values can be ranked
inalterably high or low in a judge’s hierarchy of values and that
legal advocates can do very little to influence such entrenched
values. Furthermore, some commonly recurring legal issues—like
constitutional issues—implicate the same competing values—such
as crime control versus privacy, or public safety versus gun rights.
With regard to such recurring issues, most judges have already
decided which of the competing values is more important to them
personally, and there is very little a legal advocate can do to alter
that hierarchy in a specific case. That said, there are many times
when a legal advocate can favorably influence in a judge’s mind
the perceived importance of a value underlying a policy argument.
Many legal issues pit two or more values against each other that a
judge has only rarely (if ever) compared in the past. In these
circumstances, the judge must decide, without a preconceived
ranking, which of the competing values is personally more
important. And it is in these instances that an opportunity to
persuade exists.
For example, in our interspousal immunity hypothetical, a
judge must choose between the value of protecting marriage as an
institution and the values of citizen access to courts and
compensation for injuries. Most judges have never thought about
juxtaposing these values, much less have had to choose between
them. Thus, a legal advocate on either side of this issue would have
an opportunity to try to enhance in the judge’s mind the perceived
importance of the value or values underlying the advocate’s
argument over the competing value or values.
1. State Policy Arguments in Terms of Avoiding a Societal Loss
Rather Than in Terms of Acquiring a Societal Gain
Earlier, we discussed the fact that policy arguments can be
viewed either as arguments designed to achieve a societal gain or
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as arguments designed to avoid a societal loss.108 Despite these two
possible approaches, I have consistently used the terminology of
the latter in this Part, explaining the various advocacy strategies we
have covered thus far in terms of avoiding loss. I have taken this
approach because several cognitive phenomena, when considered
together, suggest that policy arguments are more persuasive if they
are phrased in terms of avoiding a loss as opposed to acquiring a
gain.
Here is a description of the relevant cognitive phenomena:


Loss Aversion: Loss aversion refers to the well-documented
tendency of people to be more motivated by the fear of loss
than they are by the prospect of gain.109 Consider this simple
but popular example: “For most people, the fear of losing $100
is more intense than the hope of gaining $150.”110



The Endowment Effect: The endowment effect is related to loss
aversion. This term refers to the tendency of people to
experience more pain in giving up something they possess than
the pleasure they would experience in acquiring the same
thing.111 Professor Dobelli offers this example in the context of
commodities: “We consider things to be more valuable the
moment we own them. In other words, if we are selling
something, we charge more for it than what we ourselves
would be willing to spend.”112



Negativity Bias: Negativity bias refers to the tendency of
people to be more impacted by negative experiences and
information than they are by positive experiences and
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information.113
The combination of these three phenomena strongly suggests
that legal advocates should phrase their policy arguments in terms
of avoiding loss. While loss aversion suggests this strategy most
directly, the endowment effect and negativity bias confirm this
advice. Any future negative consequences resulting from a court’s
decision will require society to give up an existing asset: a positive
or neutral state of existence. Conversely, future positive
consequences represent the prospect of a societal gain. Under the
endowment effect, the fear of giving up a societal asset is more
powerful and motivating than the pleasure associated with
acquiring a new societal asset. What’s more, any discussion about
avoiding a future loss is, by definition, a discussion phrased in the
negative, whereas the discussion of a societal gain is necessarily
positive. Negativity bias indicates that a discussion phrased in the
negative is more influential and memorable than a discussion
phrased in the positive.
Set out below is a list of the policy issues we have discussed so
far in this article. For each issue, I explain how the policy
argument in question can be phrased as avoiding a societal loss
rather than as acquiring a societal gain.


The Interspousal Immunity Hypothetical (from the defendant’s
perspective):114 State the argument in terms of avoiding the
encouragement of divorce on a societal scale (avoiding a
societal loss), rather than in terms of protecting the institution
of marriage (acquiring a societal gain).



The Interspousal Immunity Hypothetical (from the plaintiff’s
perspective):115 State the argument in terms of avoiding the
infringement or diminishment of the rights to court access and
compensation, rather than as protecting those rights.
113
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Klinger v Adams County School District and the definition of
“expenses”:116 State the argument in terms of discouraging or
deterring teachers from giving late notices of termination,
rather than in terms of encouraging teachers to give timely
notices. State as avoiding a reduction in the quality of
education, rather than as protecting the quality of education.



Smith v. United States and “using a firearm”:117 State the
argument in terms of discouraging the taking of firearms to
drug transactions, rather than in terms of encouraging drug
dealers to leave their guns at home. State as avoiding danger
and violence, rather than as advancing public safety. (It is
interesting to note that Justice O’Connor, who wrote the
majority opinion in Smith, referred to “danger” and “violence”
four times in the opinion, but made no reference to “safety” or
any variation of the word “safe.”118)



The “closing the floodgates” example:119 State the argument in
terms of avoiding the “flood” of litigation, rather than as
protecting the resources and efficiency of the court system.



Ahtna Tene Nene v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game and “the
right to attorney’s fees”:120 State the argument in terms of
avoiding “fundamental unfairness,” rather than as advancing or
promoting fairness.



Illinois v. Caballes and the “suspicionless dog sniff”:121 State
the argument in terms of avoiding an infringement on privacy
rights, rather than as securing privacy rights.
As these illustrations demonstrate, most policy arguments can
116
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be phrased in terms of either avoiding a loss or acquiring a gain.
The cognitive phenomena discussed above suggest that legal
advocates should choose the former over the latter.
2. Cite Non-Legal Materials That Help Prove the Importance
of the Implicated Value
In the section on probability assessment, we discussed the
strategy of an advocate citing non-legal sources to enhance the
perceived probability of a future consequence underlying a policy
argument.122 Interestingly, non-legal sources can also be used to
enhance the perceived importance of a value implicated by a
policy argument. Consider again the interspousal immunity
example. Earlier we discussed the strategy of an advocate for the
defense citing non-legal sources to help establish the likelihood
(i.e., probability) that some injured spouses, given the opportunity,
would choose to divorce their mates in order to get around the
interspousal immunity defense. Non-legal sources could also be
used by the defense to enhance the importance of the implicated
value: the institution of marriage. An advocate, for example, could
cite social science studies that demonstrate the benefits of marriage
to society and the negative effects of divorce, both on the children
of a marriage and on society in general.123 Citing to such materials
could help elevate the importance of marriage within the value
hierarchy of the judge deciding this issue. Thus, in considering the
use of non-legal materials, a legal advocate should realize that such
materials can be used in two completely different capacities in a
policy argument: (1) to help prove the probability of the asserted
consequences of the policy argument, as we saw earlier in this
article, and (2) to help enhance the perceived importance of the
value implicated by the policy argument, as we can see in this
section.
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3. Cite Cases from Other Contexts That Help Prove the
Importance of the Implicated Value

In addition to citing non-legal materials to prove the
importance of a value implicated in a policy argument, an advocate
can also cite case law for this purpose.124 That is, an advocate can
cite case law—either from another jurisdiction or from within the
same jurisdiction but in a different context—that has previously
recognized the importance of the value implicated in the
advocate’s policy argument. Using case law in this manner can
help the advocate enhance the perceived importance of the value in
question by demonstrating that courts have relied on that value in
resolving policy questions in the past.
We can see an illustration of this strategy in the case of
Maryland v. Blackman.125 One of the issues in Blackman was
whether a person has the right to use violence to resist an illegal
frisk by police officers.126 In deciding this issue, the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals relied on the policy argument that in
order to secure the safety of peace officers, the law should
discourage citizens from engaging in violent self-help, even if they
are being wronged by the police.127 In support of this policy
rationale, the court cited a prior case—Jupiter v. Maryland128 —
that recognized the policy against violent self-help in a completely
different context. In the Jupiter case, the Maryland Supreme Court
had articulated a policy against violent self-help in affirming the
robbery conviction of a man who engaged in self-help by using a
shotgun to force a store employee to sell the man beer.129 Although
the Jupiter case recognized the policy against violent self-help in a
completely different setting, the Blackman court cited Jupiter as
support for its policy conclusion:
Close questions as to whether an officer possesses
articulable suspicion must be resolved in the
124

Professor Margolis briefly discusses this strategy. See Margolis, Closing
the Floodgates, supra note 2, at 80–81.
125
617 A.2d 619 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
126
Id. at 630–31.
127
Id. at 630.
128
616 A.2d 412 (Md. 1992).
129
Id. at 417.

SOCIOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS

81

courtroom and not fought out on the streets. Albeit
uttered in the different context of not permitting a
“claim of right” to be asserted as a defense to
robbery, the words of Judge Rodowsky in Jupiter v.
State, 328 Md. 635, 616 A.2d 412 (1992), well
express our disdain for permitting self-help by way
of force and violence, “There are strong public
policy reasons why self-help, involving the use of
force against a person, should not be condoned.”130
As this quote illustrates, the Blackman court cited a case
decided in a completely different context to enhance the perceived
importance of the value underlying its policy rationale. That is, the
author of the Blackman opinion used the Jupiter case not as
authority on the substantive issue before the court, but as authority
for the importance of the implicated value itself. Advocates should
take notice of the strategy used by the court in Blackman and
consider using case law from a different context (or from the same
context in a different jurisdiction) to enhance the importance of the
value underlying a policy argument in a brief.
4. Consider Using a Thematic Literary Reference.
In my Advanced Legal Writing textbook, I explore the
rhetorical functions of thematic literary references in persuasive
legal writing.131 In that discussion, I specifically examine how a
thematic literary reference can be used by a legal advocate to
enhance the importance of a value implicated in a legal
argument.132 That discussion has relevance here in our exploration
of strategies for increasing the perceived importance of a value in
the context of policy-based persuasion.
As I define it in my book, a thematic literary reference occurs
when “a persuasive writer, in making an argument, includes a
reference to a literary work the theme of which supports the
writer’s argument.”133 Much scholarship has been produced in the
130
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field of cognitive science that demonstrates that the reading of
literary works helps shape a person’s values and morals.134
According to this scholarship, when people read literary works,
they are allowed to observe and vicariously experience the
consequences of certain types of behavior and, by so doing,
develop and refine their values systems.135 As Mark Johnson put it,
“Fictional narratives provide us with rich, humanly realistic
experimental settings in which we can make our own moral
explorations.”136
Here is my prior explanation of how a thematic literary
reference can enhance the perceived importance of a value
implicated in a legal argument:
[O]ne strategy in persuasion is to attempt to elevate
in the mind of the decision-maker the importance of
the value supporting an advocate’s position over the
competing values. If literary works helped to form
the favorable value in the mind of the decisionmaker in the first place, then an allusion to one of
these literary works can serve to activate and
enhance the importance of that value among and in
relation to the various other values in the decisionmaker’s value system. Referring to a literary work
that is part of the decision-maker’s mental
storehouse of literary texts allows the decisionmaker to “relive” the original experience of reading
that text. As Professor Johnson explained above, the
decision-maker’s original reading of the text helped
to form the value in question by allowing him or her
to see the implications and consequences of that
value within the “experimental setting” of literary
fiction. A later allusion to that text in a persuasive
document allows the decision-maker to reexperience that imaginary journey of discovery and
to again appreciate the importance of the value or
134
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lesson learned on that journey. Thus, for issues that
implicate competing yet equally ranked values in
the mind of the decision-maker, the incorporation of
a reference to a literary work that aided in the
original formation of one of those values has the
power to enhance the importance of that value over
the competing values. Consequently, that value will
likely play a greater role in the ultimate decision by
the decision-maker.137
We can see an example of the use of a thematic literary
reference in a policy argument in Justice William Brennan’s
dissent in the case of Florida v. Riley.138 In Riley, the majority of
the United States Supreme Court upheld warrantless police
helicopter surveillance from an altitude of 400 feet.139 In his
dissent, Justice Brennan made a policy argument based on the
value of privacy and offered the following thematic reference to
George Orwell’s novel, 1984:
The Fourth Amendment demands that we temper
our efforts to apprehend criminals with a concern
for the impact on our fundamental liberties of the
methods we use. I hope it will be a matter of
concern to my colleagues that the police
surveillance methods they would sanction were
among those described 40 years ago in George
Orwell’s dread vision of life in the 1980’s:
The black-mustachio’d face gazed
down from every commanding
corner. There was one on the house
front immediately opposite. BIG
BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU,
the caption said. . . . In the far
distance a helicopter skimmed down
between the roofs, hovered for an
instant like a bluebottle, and darted
away again with a curving flight. It
137
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was the Police Patrol, snooping into
people’s windows.
Nineteen Eighty-Four 4 (1949).
Who can read this passage without a
shudder, and without the instinctive reaction that it
depicts life in some country other than ours? I
respectfully dissent.140
For those who read 1984, the novel likely played a role in the
formation and solidification of the value of privacy from
governmental intrusion. Thus, Justice Brennan’s literary allusion to
this work was designed to enhance in the minds of his readers the
perceived importance of the value of privacy. This was done in an
effort to prove that the majority reached the wrong result by
sacrificing the value of privacy in the name of the competing social
value of crime prevention.
As we can see from this example, a thematic literary reference
can add significant force to an argument based on an appeal to
values. Because all policy arguments, by definition, are based on
an appeal to values, this strategy is available to legal advocates in
this context. For more information on how specifically to construct
a thematic literary reference, I encourage you to read my lengthy
treatment of this topic in my textbook.141
D. Increase the Memorability of the Policy Argument
The final cognitive process relevant to policy-based persuasion
is memorability. A policy argument in a brief is persuasive only if
the reader can remember the argument after he or she puts the brief
down. Thus, the memorability of the argument is also critical in
policy-based persuasion.
For our purposes, the most important cognitive phenomenon
regarding memorability is the Van Restorff Effect. According to the
Van Restorff Effect, people remember things that are highlighted
or that otherwise stand out from their surroundings.142 While that
140
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concept seems like common sense, cognitive research confirms it.
Thus, the final general strategy for improving a policy argument in
a brief is to make it stand out from the rest of the brief.
One way to make a policy argument stand out in a brief is to
give the argument its own section in the brief, together with its
own point heading.143 The literature on brief writing provides
conflicting advice on whether a policy argument in a legal brief
should be interwoven with another argument or whether it should
be given its own section and point heading.144 From a
memorability standpoint, however, the Van Restorff Effect
strongly suggests that a policy argument in a brief should be
presented prominently, not subtlely.145
The second way to draw attention to a policy argument is to
incorporate poetic language. Cognitive scientists have confirmed
what classical rhetoricians have long known: ideas expressed with
rhetorical flair are more memorable than ideas expressed in
common prose.146
Many rhetorical devices, called figures of speech, have been
identified as giving language a poetic quality.147 Some of these
figures of speech are familiar to most of us, like metaphor, simile,
and alliteration. Others are less known and can have bizarre143
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sounding names, like metonymy and epistrophe.148 A complete list
of rhetorical figures of speech is beyond the coverage of this
article. For those interested in a comprehensive discussion of how
to incorporate figures of speech in persuasive legal writing, I
encourage you to review Chapters 9–15 of my textbook, Advanced
Legal Writing.149 Here, however, I will provide a couple of simple
examples in the context of policy persuasion.
Recall the Supreme Court case of Smith v. United States, in
which Justice O’Connor wrote a majority opinion holding that the
phrase “uses . . . a firearm” in relation to a drug transaction
includes using a firearm as an item of trade for drugs.150 Recall
further that Justice O’Connor supported this conclusion with the
policy argument that firearms are dangerous and pose a threat to
safety even if they are present as only items of barter. Justice
O’Connor punctuated this argument with this artful use of
alliteration: “[A]s experience demonstrates, [a gun] can be
converted instantaneously from currency to cannon.”151 The use of
this poetic language was not accidental. Her elegant use of
alliteration helped Justice O’Connor etch her policy argument in
the mind of her reader.
As another example, consider this clever use of simile in a per
curiam decision by the Supreme Court while arguing the policy of
free expression:
“Being free to engage in unlimited political
expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is
like being free to drive an automobile as far and as
often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.”152
In another example, Judge Kenneth Hall of the Fourth Circuit
148
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crafted an artistic metaphor to highlight his argument for a broad
definition of mail fraud:
“[A] civil RICO suit may be maintained, not only in
mail fraud cases where the deceitful mailing is the
blade rushing down toward the guillotine victim,
but also in cases involving more grandiose schemes
to cheat, where the mail is but part of the frame that
holds the blade.”153
And here is an alliterative example from Supreme Court Justice
Frank Murphy as he expresses the Court’s commitment to the
policies underlying federal income tax law and the Court’s holding
that embezzled funds are not subject to income tax:
“Moral turpitude is not a touchstone of taxability.”154
In all of these examples, the authors of the opinions made their
policy arguments more memorable by using a figure of speech to
highlight a key component of the argument. As a final example, we
return again to where we started: our interspousal immunity
hypothetical. In that scenario we, as attorneys for the defendant,
argued that a suit between divorced spouses for a tort committed
during marriage should be barred because to hold otherwise would
encourage divorce as a means of getting around the interspousal
immunity defense. As we discussed earlier, this policy argument is
based on the value of marriage as a social institution and the
corresponding fear of widespread divorce. The main thrust of the
argument is that the preservation of marriage as a social institution
is more important than an individual’s right to sue for personal
injuries. To highlight this argument, we could perhaps employ the
rhetorical device of alliterative antithesis, which creates rhythmic
phrasing by combining alliteration with the parallel grammatical
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structure of antithesis:155
A citizen’s right to sue is outweighed by the
commonwealth’s commitment to marriage.
A statement such as this—that is, a statement that summarizes
an important component of our policy argument using a poetic
figure of speech—would help us as brief writers to highlight that
point within our brief. And highlighting this point, according to the
Van Restorff Effect, would help make the argument more
memorable to our reader.
IV. CONCLUSION
Policy arguments are indispensable to effective written legal
advocacy. As this article demonstrates, social science scholarship
offers many insights into human behavior that can assist legal
advocates in improving the persuasiveness of their policy
arguments.
As an initial matter, we explored the general characteristics of
a policy argument in terms of sociological and cognitive principles
and examined the unique role that such arguments play in legal
advocacy. We also saw that from a cognitive perspective, policy
arguments in legal advocacy can be broken down into two broad
categories: (1) policy arguments that focus on only the future
societal consequences of the court’s decision in the present case,
and (2) policy arguments that focus on both the present and the
future societal consequences of the court’s decision in the present
155
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case.
In the last section, we explored four general cognitive
strategies advocates can use to improve the persuasiveness of their
policy arguments. The latter three of these four strategies included
specific sub-strategies that offer detailed guidelines for brief
writers. Here is a summarizing outline of the strategies we
explored:
1. Take advantage of the fear of future loss – From a
cognitive standpoint, policy arguments that fall under the
first category—i.e., policy arguments that focus primarily
on future potential consequences—are generally more
persuasive than policy arguments that fall under the second
category—i.e., policy arguments that focus on both
immediate and future consequences. The cognitive
phenomena underlying this observation include the
uncertainty effect, status quo bias, and the mere exposure
effect. In view of these phenomena, advocates, in making
policy arguments, should stress the potential future impact
of the court’s decision on society over the more immediate
impact.
2. Increase the perceived probability of the consequences
underlying a policy argument – Because future-oriented
policy arguments focus on the potential future
consequences of a court’s decision in the present case, the
strength of such arguments depends largely on how
probable the foretold consequences seem in the mind of the
judge. Strategies for increasing the perceived probability of
the foretold consequences include the following:
 Cite non-legal materials that help prove the
probability of the asserted consequences.
 Take advantage of the conjunction fallacy
by combining more extreme consequences
with
less
extreme,
more
likely
consequences.
 Account for the availability heuristic by
providing vivid and easily imaginable
examples of the asserted consequences.
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3. Increase the perceived importance of the consequences
underlying a policy argument – The strength of a policy
argument also depends largely on the importance the
deciding judge gives to the threatened consequences and
the social values implicated by those consequences.
Strategies for increasing the perceived importance of the
consequences underlying a policy argument include the
following:
 Take advantage of a number of related
cognitive
phenomena—including
loss
aversion, the endowment effect, and
negativity bias—by stating policy arguments
in terms of avoiding a societal loss rather
than in terms of acquiring a societal gain.
 Cite non-legal materials that help prove the
importance of the asserted consequences and
the attendant social values. As we saw, nonlegal materials can be used in two
completely different capacities in a policy
argument: (1) to help prove the probability
of the asserted consequences of the policy
argument, as indicated in item 2 above; and
(2) to help enhance the perceived
importance of the value implicated by the
policy argument, as indicated here.
 Cite cases from other contexts that help
prove the importance of the asserted
consequences and the attendant social
values.
 Consider using a thematic literary reference.
4. Increase the memorability of a policy argument – To be
persuasive, a policy argument must be remembered by the
reader after the reader puts the advocate’s brief down.
Strategies for increasing the memorability of a policy
argument include the following:
 Give a policy argument in a brief its own
section and point heading.
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Use poetic language—i.e., a rhetorical figure
of speech—to highlight an important
component of a policy argument.

While this article explores the implications of social science
theory on policy-based persuasion, it is intended only as a first
step. Many additional revelations about human cognition and
social interaction can be applied to this topic. While the literature
on written legal advocacy has been slow to address in any serious
way the skill of policy-based persuasion, I predict this topic will
garner more attention in the future. Many legal issues, particularly
issues on appeal, come down to a choice between competing
policy considerations. As a consequence, the future of advocacy
pedagogy will undoubtedly include further exploration into the
cognitive and sociological dimensions of policy-based decisionmaking.

